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Context and justification
• Raise of MBI including PES / AEM in agriculture
– What impact regarding change in practices and ES provision ? 
 Lack of work applying modern methods of causal inference to environmental 
economics (Greenstone and Gayer, 2009)
• Environmental Benefit Compensation (RBA) in Costa Rica 
– 2006-2010: Interamerican Development Bank funds (USD 17,6 million for 4 years)
– 2010-…: National budget funding (renewed thanks to a questionable evaluation)
– Designed and administrated by the extension services of Ministry of Agriculture
– Double aim: increase in productivity + improvement in water and soil quality
– Direct incentive to farmers’ “environmental-friendly” investments
• List of 81 eligible technology (mainly sector-specific)
• 4 classes of investment according to environmental externality, collective interest and 
implementation, and type of pay-off (from 20 to 30% of the total cost excluding labour
costs)
• Only members of farmers organizations are eligible
• Conditional payment (expost)
– Two main sectors : Livestock production (investment at farm level) and coffee 
sector (coffee processing at cooperative level)
Research questions and hypothesis 
• Main research questions 
– Do the RBA have an impact the investment toward 
a adoption of greener practices ?
– Do the RBA impact green intensification level and 
ES provision ? 
• Hypothesis 
– RBA have an influence on investment enabling 
green intensification process
– RBA have influence on level of intensification and 
ES provision
Concept and methodology (1)
Impact evaluation principle
Control
Delta Y
• Program intervention: voucher/subsidy to reduce investment costs in “green” 
technologies  to enable constraint farmers to implement it
=> What would the beneficiaries have done if they would not have received RBA?          
=> Windfall effect (for non-constrained beneficiaries) or additional investment? 
Concept and methodology (2)
Difference-in-difference method
• Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence = combination between before/after and with/without 
situation, in order to measure RBA net impact on the treated population
(=Average Treatment effect on the Treated)
⇒ control for time-unvarying observed and unobserved heterogeneity 
(dynamism, managerial abilities) 
• Counterfactual / control group choice:
⇒ Recent participants show willingness to enter the program so they are likely 
to be similar to the past beneficiaries (pipe-line assumption)
⇒ Parallel trends between the recent beneficiaries’ group and the treated 
group if it would have not received RBA incentive
⇒ No anticipation effect because the program is not well-known, participation 
depends on the reception of the information (SUTVA)
Material
• Case of North of Guanacaste 
region
– Dry area – Water issue
– Livestock extensive raising
– Main sub sector and area for 
RBA use
• A Data base of RBA project demand 
(from Min Agri)
• Household Survey (in march – may 2013)
– 63 households random from RBA database
• 32 beneficiaries in 2007/2012  (treated group) 
• 31  applying to RBA in 2013 (control group) 
– 4 elements : 
• farm  layout evolution (mapping) / land use evolution  2006-2012  
• Farm  management and assets 
• Resource management
• Socio economic characteristics
Source: Projects  database (MAG) ; estimated costs excluding labor costs
What does sampled RBA participants apply for?
Sample
description
Expected effect on livestock farming and ES
RBA
Investment enabling green 
intensification process
Investment promoting 
ES provision
Indicators of “green” 
intensification level
Diversification of production
Adoption of practices
Substitution of labor by capital
Spatial concentration
Water (Qual. Quant.)
Carbon 
Level of cattle raising intensity : 
Animal charge / inputs / cycle of pasture
Forest Cover (ha,l)
Level of landscape fragmentation 
Environmental degradation practices 
(fire, herbicides)
Soil
Silvopastoral management
Pasture optimization
Fodder Production 
Animal nutrition enhancing
Water alimentation enhancement
Manure management
Sustainable energy
Capital level
(build./ equip./machine)
Analytical methods
• Participation variable: dummy variable (1 for 2007-2012 projects 
beneficiaries / 0 for 2013 project participants)
– Sub-samples: participation limited to the specific asset studied 
(excluding the other 2007-2012 projects beneficiaries)
• Outcome variables: 
1) Eligible assets by “green” intensification practice components
2) General indicators of “green” intensification
• Control variables: time-variant determinants of 
investment/practice choices
– Income shifters: family off-farm work (lingroff), social transfers (ingrgob)
– Consumption shifters: family size (lhht), age structure (lmen12, lmay60)
– Other observed preference shifters: own farm size (larea_prop~p)
• Estimator: fixed-effect estimator (within)
Results
Sample Asset specific sub-sample Whole sample
Model
Without 
control
With
control
Without 
control
With 
control
Silvopastoral management
PCA index on living fences (m) + 
living fences or reforestation to 
protect water sources (0/1) + area of 
high tree density pastures (Ha) + 
area recently planted with trees (Ha)
Coefficient RBA 0,0915 -0,305 0,069 -0,24
Robust standard error 0,1097 0,3697 0,084 0,36
p-value for joint 
significativity (F test)
0,41 0,26 0,42 0,53
Living fences (m)
Coefficient RBA 372,22* -145,21 334,62** -394,32
Robust standard error 185,79 489,18 139,48 511,76
p-value (F test) 0,05 (*) 0,00 (***) 0,02 (**) 0,15
Pasture optimization
Improved pasture (Ha)
Coefficient RBA 8,28*** -0,830 9,26*** -0,195
Robust standard error 2,96 6,28 3,38 6,98
p-value (F test) 0,01 (**) 0,00 (***) 0,01 (**) 0,00 (***)
Fodder production
PCA index on fodder shed (m²) + 
fodder bank of sugarcane and grass 
(Ha) + silo (m3) + tree/shrub fodder 
bank (Ha) + forage mincer (number)
Coefficient RBA 0,690*** 0,289 0,549*** 0,218
Robust standard error 0,137 0,218 0,120 0,208
p-value for joint 
significativity (F test)
0,00 (***) 0,00 (***) 0,00 (***) 0,00 (***)
Fodder bank of sugarcane 
and grass (Ha)
Coefficient RBA 0,639** -0,388 0,439** -0,525
Robust standard error 0,263 0,912 0,193 0,902
p-value (F test) 0,02 (**) 0,50 0,03 (**) 0,35
1) Average treatment effect on the treated: investment in eligible assets
NB: All estimations include individual and time-ﬁxed eﬀects ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 from t-test
no  confident model
Confident model but no 
robust coefficient
Confident model but no 
robust coefficient 
Confident  model and robust coeff. 
but limited effect 
(even not negative)
Confident model but no 
robust coefficient 
2) Average treatment effect on the treated: general “green” 
intensification indicators / FIXED CAPITAL
Building index Equipment index Machine index
-1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -2
RBA 0.813*** 0.453* 0.962*** 0.594** 0.364*** 0.212
(0.177) (0.236) (0.185) (0.246) (0.127) (0.145)
lingroff 2.623*** 2.441*** 0.509**
(0.863) (0.825) (0.212)
ingrgob 0.703 0.774** 0.536**
(0.452) (0.333) (0.252)
lhht -0.418 -0.448 0.398
(0.542) (0.471) (0.274)
lmen12 0.622 -0.530 -0.178
(0.566) (0.374) (0.240)
lmay60 0.0768 -1.392** -0.00837
(0.798) (0.541) (0.392)
larea_prop~p 0.767* 1.899*** 1.071***
(0.409) (0.506) (0.353)
2012.year 0.354* 0.358* 0.0501
(0.189) (0.199) (0.0974)
_cons -0.206*** -2.933** -0.244*** -5.952*** -0.0925*** -3.952***
(0.0449) (1.392) (0.0469) (1.694) (0.0324) (1.122)
N 126 126 126 126 126 126
R-sq 0.184 0.594 0.229 0.619 0.149 0.439
Results
NB: All estimations include individual ﬁxed eﬀects ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 from t-test
Clear positive effect of RBA on Fixed Capital
2) Average treatment effect on the treated: general “green” 
intensification indicators / FOREST COVER
Results
Forest area (Ha) Scrubland area (Ha) Plantation area (Ha)
-1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -2
RBA -7.945 -13.00 -6.083* -2.592 0.141* -0.0512
(6.413) (8.814) (3.619) (6.992) (0.0707) (0.194)
lingroff 45.14 6.458 0.664
(39.69) (8.181) (0.444)
ingrgob 4.711 -1.842 0.564*
(7.403) (7.488) (0.317)
lhht -17.44 2.903 0.170
(14.76) (6.268) (0.274)
lmen12 -1.622 14.32 0.129
(7.650) (12.12) (0.174)
lmay60 -2.962 -6.194 0.385
(12.37) (9.068) (0.370)
larea_prop~p 6.893 2.864 -0.0805
(7.608) (4.530) (0.0820)
2012.year 2.273 -2.223 0.116
(4.521) (6.618) (0.182)
_cons 19.98*** 12.96 4.767*** -8.992 0.231*** -0.0251
(1.629) (26.80) (0.919) (11.26) (0.0180) (0.408)
N 126 126 126 126 126 126
R-sq 0.024 0.147 0.047 0.110 0.018 0.201
NB: All estimations include individual ﬁxed eﬀects ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 from t-test
RBA seems to have a negative 
effect on Forest 
and Schrubland area
(But not robust coefficient)
(not robust 
coefficient)
2) Average treatment effect on the treated: general “green” 
intensification indicators / LANDSCAPE FRAGMENTATIONResults
Number of land use 
units
Mean area of land use 
units
Mean area of pasture 
units
-1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -2
RBA 5.219*** 0.330 -3.061** -1.376 -1.950** 1.893
(1.598) (1.303) (1.153) (1.786) (0.739) (1.583)
lingroff 14.61** -0.232 0.125
(7.282) (2.186) (2.010)
ingrgob 2.161 -0.265 -2.046
(1.920) (1.297) (3.104)
lhht -3.069 0.793 1.504
(3.914) (2.171) (2.508)
lmen12 -8.444* 6.261 4.477
(5.019) (3.890) (4.488)
lmay60 -0.566 2.038 2.472
(3.994) (1.778) (3.303)
larea_prop~p 15.64*** 1.582 -2.605
(0.898) (1.369) (4.284)
2012.year 1.642* -1.351 -3.260**
(0.943) (1.367) (1.419)
_cons 13.44*** -33.00*** 6.347*** 0.165 6.517*** 13.01
(0.406) (5.395) (0.293) (4.401) (0.200) (13.65)
N 126 126 126 126 126 126
R-sq 0.120 0.458 0.109 0.192 0.055 0.317
NB: All estimations include individual ﬁxed eﬀects ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 from t-test
RBA seems to 
increase 
number of 
land use unit
RBA seems to 
reduce 
land use 
mean area
(not robust 
coefficient)
2) Average treatment effect on the treated: general “green” 
intensification indicators / LIVESTOCK FARMING INTENSIFICATION
Results
Number of livestock units per Ha 
of pastures
-1 -2
RBA 0.203 1.241
(0.205) (0.886)
lingroff 1.594
(2.393)
ingrgob 8.077*
(4.683)
lhht -14.08*
(8.103)
lmen12 -4.492
(3.604)
lmay60 -13.25*
(7.714)
larea_prop~p -3.147***
(0.802)
2012.year -0.801
(0.797)
_cons 2.239*** 28.75***
(0.0556) (10.40)
N 114 99
R-sq 0.001 0.477
No significant coefficient
No effect of RBA 
Limits and further steps
• Limits
– Local studies, complex extrapolation of results for RBA 
(context specificity)
– Data collection limits => Impossible to grasp institutional / 
local factors  
– No possibility to analyze synergy with Eco label  (as almost 
not developed for cattle raising)
• Further steps to refine analysis
– Analyze capital increase in an aggregated continuous way 
(value of capital asset stock instead of an index)
– Analyze substitution between eligible and non eligible 
investment 
– Evaluate ES effect using practice/ES gridline derived from 
Risemp project
Conclusion
• RBA do impact the farms assets level (building, equipment, 
machine)
• We could not conclude on the effect of RBA on specific 
investments for intensification process (biological assets), nor 
intensification indicators (forest cover, land fragmentation, or 
livestock density
• RBA appears more as a subsidy program to increase farmers’ 
capital than a direct and positive incentive program affecting 
environmental practices adoption (indirect effect) in a perennial 
ways
• Design of the program should incorporate more performance 
based approach if wanted to increase environmental efficiency
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